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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The idea of this study arose because such great 
uncertainty seems to exist regarding the way in which political 
factors affect the black worker in South Africa. After discussions 
around this topic the United States Department of State agreed 
to finance a project to explore the relationships between political 
attitudes and industrial issues among blacks in South Africa. 
Grateful acknowledgement must be made to the fieldwork teams of 
IMS (Pty) Ltd and CASS for the conducting of high quality field-
work in a short space of time. 
Introduction 
After somewhat of a lull in black political activity following 
the end of the township disturbances of 1976 onwards, political 
activism among blacks in South Africa is clearly evident again. 
Township disturbances of a generalised nature have followed 
recent protests and demonstrations among black, Indian and 
Coloured students and pupils directed at elections for the 
new constitutional dispensation that excludes blacks. A 
succession of black school boycotts have both preceded and 
accompanied these events. In the past few weeks a new factor 
emerged in the form of violence accompanying a long-expected 
black mineworkers strike, although this phenomenon is probably 
much more limited in scope and duration than the others. 
The bulk of the activism appears to be concentrated among 
youthful groups which in the past have not succeeded in 
gaining active support from older blacks and workers. A 
call was made for a stay-at-home strike in Soweto on 
Monday the 17th of September, but with rather indefinite 
results. Adults were involved in some of the rent demonstra-
tions earlier in the townships of the Vaal Triangle but were 
much less visibly involved in active street confrontations 
with the police. 
Events like these focus attention sharply on South Africa's 
black workers, who naturally have much greater strategic 
leverage than the youth and without whom militant political 
strategies are not likely to have incisive effects on the 
system. At a time like this it is of some interest, therefore, 
to examine the political and strategic views of black industrial 
workers, which is what this analysis sets out to do. The field-
work was carried out mainly in May 1984 when the political 
consciousness accompanying present events should already have 
developed. 
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The study examines the attitudes of black industrial workers to 
a range of political and strategic issues. Very basically it 
poses the question of how radical, or ready for confrontation, 
black workers are at the present time. In doing so attention 
is also directed at these very important issues, in which politics, 
labour and economic issues are intertwined. One is the extent 
to which political factors hav*_ penetrated the consciousness as 
regards industrial relations among black workers. Another is. 
to what extent political issues have caused black workers to 
question the capitalist system. A third major issue, related 
to the others, is whether black workers support disinvestment 
and boycotts as external methods of opposing apartheid. 
Of all these questions the disinvestment campaign is perhaps the 
most complex and multi-facetted issue, and more needs to be said 
about this before proceeding to the analysis of the results. 
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Disinvestment and Constructive Engagement 
Two strategic positions have emerged very clearly in the 
external action with regard to South Africa. One position may be 
termed the "disinvestment" position, which has as its basic premise 
that change would be achieved if the flow of external capital to 
South Africa could be reduced or cut off, and can include the view 
that trade sanctions would also be effective in undermining apartheid. 
Another position is that economic growth will contribute to the 
weakening of apartheid and particularly that external capitalists can 
implement reforms in their companies in South Africa and exercise 
other pressures which will encourage more rapid change. This is 
a "constructive engagement" position. 
The disengagment position i r informed from a number of sources 
and it can only be fully understood if one bears in mind that South African 
political refugees have been prominent in organisations, like the Anti-
Apartheid Movement, which have promoted this position. After several 
trips abroad, conversations with various informed people in the U.S. 
and the U.K. and a reading of the relevant literature it would seem that 
the disinvestment programme (and for that matter the trade sanction 
movement) has emerged out of the following orientations, not all of which 
are held by each and every individual or group active in the disinvestment 
programme and which are not neccessarily the same as the public 
arguments used: 
- a revolutionary orientation, in terms of which it can 
be argued that disinvestment will weaken the industrial 
system in South Africa, thereby weakening the tax-base 
and the resources of the state, paving the way for armed 
4 . 
insurrection to overthrow a weakened system. Although 
it would not often be openly stated, this orientation 
can include the notion that disinvestment will 
deepen the poverty of blacks, thereby stimulating 
revolutionary action; 
- a fundamentally anti-capital ist attitude, which easily 
becomes aligned with the notion that capitalism has 
structured the emergence of apartheid and continues to 
underpin it (this view is distinct from a more informed 
Marxist view since Marx himself argued that capitalist 
production had to reach an advanced stage of development 
before a proletariat would achieve the consciousness and 
resources to oppose capital); 
- a milder anti-capitalist attitude which is fairly 
unstructured, and involves the fairly vague notion that 
capitalists are selfish and profiteering and that any 
action against the system may produce some good; 
- a strategic orientation, notably that disinvestment will 
reduce the flow of capital and much needed technology to 
South Africa, and as such frighten or coerce the South 
African Government into making concessions; 
- an empirical orientation, which arises out of various 
analyses which suggest that wage and opportunity 
differentials between the races have been maintained despite 
economic growth (counter-evidence to this is available and 
is probably ignored as propaganda); 
- an attitude of political solidarity with black South 
African spokesmen, most of whom appear to favour 
disinvestment (Study Commission on U.S. Policy toward 
Southern Africa, 1981: 425) or with third world interests; 
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-an attitude of diffuse hostility towards South Africa 
which inclines people to support anything which seems 
to be opposed to the whites in the country without 
much thought for the consequences. 
Support for continued investment or at least for the continued 
operation of those companies already in South Africa seems to be 
derived from the following kinds of orientations: 
- the view that capitalist interests are not synonymous 
with state policies and that economic growth produces 
needs which contradict some government policies, such 
as influx control, job reservation, unequal provision 
of education, etc; 
- the view that if external companies were to continue 
operating in South Africa and were to deliberately 
implement labour reforms and social responsibi1ity 
programmes then a positive effect could be exercised 
on the process of reform in South Africa; 
- the view that rank-and-file blacks would suffer most 
through disinvestment and other policies aimed at 
weakening the South African economy; 
- the view that disinvestment would not make much 
difference to the South African economy and that 
capital flows would be replaced from other sources; 
- the view that disinvestment is in part a strategy aimed 
at violence since it proposes a weakening of the system 
so as to facilitate and encourage a successful insurrection 
in the country. 
A number of these orientations make certain assumptions about 
the attitudes of black people in South Africa. Some viewpoints assume 
that black people support disinvestment or trade sanctions, and that blacks 
are so oppressed by capitalism that its destruction would be supported. 
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A variation on this is that blacks would be prepared to endure 
hardships if it were to be accompanied by the eventual destruction of 
apartheid. Another view is that South African blacks, whatever 
their individual situations, give support to organisations like the 
A.N.C. and will support the programmes that the A.N.C. espouses, 
Tike disinvestment. 
A particular consideration which has emerged in recent times 
is that blacks, because of the continued co-existence of white rule 
and capitalism, have become estranged from all "ruling classes" in 
South Africa, and would be prepared to support anti-capitalist 
strategies on ideological grounds. 
In the debate over capitalism, disinvestment and change in 
South Africa, however, rank-and-file black people are seldom if ever 
consulted. Nevertheless a great many people speak on their behalf. 
In the report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy toward Southern 
Africa we read: "Finally, it is argued, black South Africans support 
disinvestment, and their wishes should be respected" (1981:25). 
It would appear, then, that the debate about disinvestment 
and trade sanctions is,to say the least,very strongly informed by 
pre-conceived notions and orientations based on a variety of ideological 
positions. It is a debate which constantly runs the risk of 
developing a dynamic all of its own, quite independent of the desires 
of the mass of South Africa's peoples or of the more concrete 
possibilities of various types of pressures for reform being 
successful. (For a fuller treatment of the debate around capitalism, 
apartheid and change see Nolotshungu (1983), Schlemmer and Webster (1978) 
and Wright (1977). 
This analysis is a modest attempt to introduce one element 
of empirical reality into the debate. It offers the carefully 
researched opinions of those black people in South Africa who are 
most directly affected by the debate; namely black South African 
production workers. It is a preliminary report in the sense that 
it presents the major trends in the data, and more detailed analysis 
is currently in preparation. The conclusions it draws regarding the 
main issues of disinvestment and trade sanctions are firm, however, 
and will not be altered by subsequent analysis. 
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Previous Research 
As already indicated very little previous empirical research 
in this area has been conducted. A number of studies of black worker 
attitudes in general have been published but few have a direct bearing 
on the major themes of this analysis. 
One study, which was in the nature of a pilot investigation, 
was undertaken by this author in 1979, among a representative quota sample 
of 150 blacks in Durban. The sample included not only production 
workers but a range of other occupations, since it was so constructed 
as to give a cross-section of black opinion. The interviews were 
conducted personally by trained black fieldworkers. Only one item 
dealing directly with disinvestment was included, as follows (item 
siightly shortened): 
"Some people say that overseas people must stop 
buying South African goods ccnd stop sending money 
to build factories in South Africa so as to frighten 
the South African government into getting rid of 
apartheid. Others say that they should continue 
because it makes jobs for all people in South Africa. " 
The results showed that only some 20 percent favoured 
disinvestment or boycotts, and fully three quarters wanted to see 
continued trading and investment. Males were more radical than 
women with 26 percent of men taking a pro-sanctions line. The 
most pro-boycott group were the supporters of the black consciousness 
movements at the time (AZAPO and AZASO) among whom 33 percent 
supported boycotts or disinvestment (Schlemmer, 1983). 
A problem with this investigation was that it was conducted 
only in the Durban area. A majority of the blacks interviewed, as 
was only to be expected in Natal, were supporters of Chief Buthelezi 
and Inkatha, which for long has adopted a pro-investment and 
constructive engagement position. Even though the results showed a 
clear trend, the same trend could not be assumed to exist in the 
major centres of employment in which externally-owned companies 
operate, namely the Witwatersrand and the Eastern Cape. 
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Very recently a major study among black employees 
was published by Professor Martin Nasser of the University of 
South Africa School of Business Leadership (Nasser 1984). The 
study covered 78 companies distributed widely throughout South 
Africa. The themes covered by the investigation did not include 
disinvestment, but the results were interpreted in the media as 
reflecting on black support for capitalism in South Africa. 
Large majorities of the black respondents gave answers which 
suggested so strong a rejection of the capitalist system that 
one might easily reach the conclusion that the employees might 
have also supported a pro-disinvestment position. Results in the 
study being reported on here, however, show that such an extension 
of Nasser's conclusions would be unwarranted. Furthermore the 
fieldwork for the Nasser study appears to have been conducted by 
means of self-completion questionnaires, which would have 
favoured the better-educated, more radical employee opinion. 
Up to now, therefore,no conclusive evidence has 
existed as to the orientations of the mass of rank-and-file 
black production workers regarding disinvestment and trade 
boycotts. The evidence which follows fills a gap in the 
information relevant to the ongoing debate. 
The Research 
In the interests of the greatest possible validity 
fieldwork was carried out by means of lengthy face to face 
interviews conducted by highly trained and experienced black 
interviewers in the language of choice of the respondent. 
In order to win the confidence of people interviewed a good 
deal of time was devoted to establishing sound rapport, and 
interviews took an average of 110 minutes each. Although 
contact with respondents was made in industrial areas all the 
interviewing took place in private, most of it in the homes 
of respondents. No interviews were conducted on factory 
premises. The interview schedule used in the fieldwork is 
not reproduced since items are given in the text. 
Since the aim was to generalise for the people 
most intimately involved in the capitalist system and particularly 
in the sector in which most multi-national companies operate -
the manufacturing sector - the sample was restricted to black male 
production workers. No list of people in this specific category 
of work is available as a sampling frame and therefore a normal 
random sample could not be drawn. The basis of the sampling 
method was the so called quota sample. In such a sample the 
selection of respondents is controlled by certain criteria in order 
to achieve representativeness. The detailed procedure was 
as follows. 
Industrial areas in the following urban complexes 
were defined: Johannesburg, Pretoria, the East Rand, the West 
Rand, the Vaal Triangle area, Port Elizabeth, Durban and Pinetown. 
Contact points were selected randomly across the industrial areas. 
Within each selected area interviewers sought respondents who 
qualified as black production workers according to age criteria. 
In all a total of 551 interviews was conducted, distributed 
as follows: 
10 . 
Johannesburg - 146 
Durban-Pinetown - 100 
Port Elizabeth - 100 
East Rand - 68 
West Rand - 59 
Pretoria - 49 
Vaal Triangle - 29 
There was deliberate over-representation of the Port 
Elizabeth and Durban areas so as to allow adequate assessments to 
be made of regional variation in attitudes. If the results had 
been significantly different according to area it would have been 
necessary to weigh the results in order to rectify for over-repre-
sentation. As it turned out, however, the differences according 
to area were generally not significant and the results could be 
combined. However, the patterns are always also specified 
separately by area so that any patterns of difference which do 
exist between regions are not obscured or hidden. The age and 
occupational characteristics of the sample are as follows: 
Age % Occupation % 
16-24 yrs - 25 Higher Semi-skilled 
25-34 yrs - 35 and skilled - 35 
35-49 yrs - 27 Lower Semi-skilled 
50+ yrs - 14 and unskilled - 65 
In the report which follows the data for the subsample 
in the Durban-Pinetown region is provided only in summary form and 
is not included in presentations of combined results since the 
major interest as far as this report is concerned lies in the 
results for those areas in which most multi-national and U.S. 
companies are to be found, namely the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-
Vereeniging area and the Port Elizabeth area, where most of the 
multi-national motor companies are situated. Thus the Durban 
results are provided by way of comparison, and the interest 
as regards these results lies mainly in the fact that the Inkatha 
position, which is dominant in Natal, openly favours a constructive 
engagement strategy. Hence Durban results appear as a separate 
comparison and as already indicated, are not included in the 
category of "overall" results. (Further details of the main sample 
(excluding Durban) are provided in Appendix I.) Finally it must 
be emphasised once again that this analysis does not attempt to 
generalise for all black factory workers but rather for black 
employees in the major industrial centres in which multi-national 
investment is concentrated. 
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The Findings 
A wide range of issues relating to capitalism and 
change in South Africa was built into the interview schedule. It 
was considered essential to assess the specific attitudes relating 
to external investment in the light of more general attitudes to 
work, to change, to political strategy and to private employers. 
The analysis commences with a review of the results concerning 
general 1ife circumstances. 
Life Satisfaction 
Attitudes to specific concerns are frequently influenced 
by general life-satisfaction or grievances. In the present study 
a method was used to measure life satisfaction which has been 
frequently used by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences in the past 
and by Hanf et al in the major Arnold Bergstraesser Institute 
study of the prospects for change in South Africa. (Hanf et al, 
1978, 1981 ). Thi'S involved showing respondents a picture of five faces 
with different expressions, each accompanied by a description of 
feelings about "life in general" which were carefully read out to 
respondents. The results were as follows: 
TABLE 1 FEELINGS ABOUT LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Overall * 
(Tvl and P.E.) 
Port 
Elizabeth 
(Durban) 
Very happy 3% 2% 8% 
Just happy 5 8 7 
Happy yet not happy 26 21 14 
Unhappy 16 17 38 
Angry and impatient 50 52 33 
= Transvaal, P.E. = Port Elizabeth 
Therefore, a majority of over 6 out of 10 blue-collar 
production workers feel either unhappy or angry about life. In the 
detailed .cross tabulations of results certain subgroups emerged as 
markedly less or more unhappy than the average. These are listed 
below with the proportions for "unhappy" and "angry" combined: 
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PROPORTION UNHAPPY AND ANGRY 
Overall 66% 
35 to 49 Years 74 
West Rand 74 
Trade Union members 76 
Std 1 to 4 Education 58 
The absolute validity of a single item index of life 
satisfaction such as this can be debated, but rather more signifi 
can be attached to standard comparisons over time, using the same 
interviewing team. 
In a previous study among black males using exactly 
the same item among a sample of black male migrant contract 
workers conducted in 1982, the proportion indicating anger or 
unhappiness was 58 percent (n 480 nationwide) (Miller and 
Schlemmer, 1982, 1985). 
Other comparative percentages drawn from the 
Arnold Bergstraesser Institute study and a general investigation 
among a sample on the Witwatersrand are the following, both once 
again reflecting "anger" and "unhappiness" combined: 1977 
(Bergstraesser Institute study) 39%, 1981 (Centre for Applied 
Social Sciences study) 56% (Schlemmer, 1983). 
From these comparisons it would seem that the male 
production workers in the present study are at least as dis-
content with life and probably more so than other categories of 
blacks in recent years on the Witwatersrand. 
Another probe on general perceptions of life in the present 
study was as follows: "Think of the present time in South Africa 
- everything that is happening. Is life for you improving, 
staying the same or getting worse?" 
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Results are as follows: 
TABLE 2 IMPROVEMENT OR DETERIORATION IN LIFE CHANCES 
Overall result and subgroups substantially more 
or less positive about life chances 
Improving 
Staying the 
same 
Getting 
worse 
Overall i 16 24 60 
Vaal Triangle ? i 10 17 72 
Pretoria i 14 16 69 
16 to 24 Yrs 5 i 15 29 56 
East Rand i 20 29 50 
Presently employed 
in U.S.Company (n55) i 16 31 53 
(Durban) °!o 14 25 60 
Here again we find an indication of majority 
dissatisfaction with life chances, with some variation by age and 
area of employment. It is interesting that those employed in U.S. 
companies are slightly less discontented than the group as a whole. 
Factors in Life Satisfaction 
Given the evidence of majority dissatisfaction in the 
sample, it is of interest to consider the factors producing both 
dissatisfaction and satisfaction with life. Our item was as follows: 
"In recent years, what things have improved 
in the lives of people like you?" 
"In recent years what things have become 
worse in the lives of people like you?" 
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The question was open-ended, with spontaneous 
answers elicited. Respondents were probed to answer fully and to 
give more than one answer, hence percentages exceed 100 in Table 
3 below which presents the results. 
TABLE 3 SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENTS AND DETERIORATION IN LIFE CHANCES), 
SPONTANEOUSLY MENTIONED 
IMPROVEMENTS DETERIORATION 
% 
Home ownership/housing 22 
Urban amenities, facili-
ties, services 16 
Business opportunities 15 
Less discrimination 12 
Education and training 11 
More/better jobs 11 
Improved standard of 
living/wages 8 
Welfare services 7 
Transport 6 
More political rights 5 
|(Others less than 5% mention) 
% 
Prices/GST/COL 55 
Political conditions/ 
policies 50 
Wages 48 
Unemployment/Job shortage 42 
Housing shortage 30 
Tax/tax deductions 26 
Social pathologies 26 
Rent increases 9 
Education 9 
Civil unrest/sabotage 8 
(Others less than 5% mention) 
No improvements 44 Nothing worse 2 
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As far as variations in these results according 
to subgroup are concerned, it is notable that the following 
patterns appear; only very salient and significant patterns and 
differences are mentioned: 
Sense of Deterioration 
Hi gher Lower 
Prices/Cost of living 50 yrs + 
West Rand 
Vaal Triangle 
Std 1-4 Educ 
1 6 - 2 4 yrs 
East Rand 
U.S. Co's 
Other Foreign Co's 
High School Educ 
Political Circumstances Soweto 
West Rand 
Trade Union 
member 
Vaal Triangle 
Less than Std. 4 
Wages Unskilled 
Vaal Triangle 
Pretoria 
Skilled 
Port Elizabeth 
U.S. Co. employees 
Many of the patterns in these results are as one 
would expect. Some are less expected. For the first time in many 
years of research the author notes that political grievances are 
high on the agenda of ordinary production workers and this represents 
a change over time. It is also quite interesting that people working 
in U.S. and foreign-owned companies have a significantly lower 
sense of grievances than others. 
Political Consciousness 
Given the very high levels of discontent and 
aggrievedness projected in answers to the items in the previous 
section one would expect to see evidence of a militant political 
consciousness among the black workers in the sample. Various 
indexes of political consciousness were included. 
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The most obvious item was one on political group 
allegiance, phrased as follows: 
"Here is a list of organisations. Which 
one of these organisations do people like 
yourself support most?/Which other one do 
people like you support?" 
The results appear in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL ORGANISATION 
Witwatersrand and 
Port Elizabeth (Durban) 
1st Choice 
% 
(1st Choice) 
7o 
ANC/Nelson Mandela 27 11 
United Democratic 
Front 11 23 
AZASO 1 1 
AZAPO 5 1 
Inkatha/Buthelezi 14 54 
Sofasonke- 15 6 
Other-diverse 5 4 
None 22 -
There is clearly a wide contrast in leadership patterns between the Natal 
area and elsewhere, although all major organisations are highly relevant 
everywhere. The high proportion of "none" outside of Natal indicates 
that there is possibly a political vacuum on the Witwatersrand and Port 
Elizabeth for more pragmatically oriented workers which is filled by 
Inkatha in Natal. These results do not cover the whole country and 
therefore one cannot say which organisation is most popular in the RSA 
on the basis of this survey. 
Coming closer to a definition of the extent of political 
militancy in the sample, one item used was indirect inasmuch 
as it relates to Namibia, hence offering respondents an 
opportunity of voicing action preferences within the relative 
safety of a displaced context as it were: 
"You have heard of Namibia .... a country with 
many more black people than white people. 
Whites still rule the country under the 
protection of the South African Government. 
What do you think black people should do in 
Namibia at the present time?" 
Spontaneous answers were classified for the analysis, which appears 
in Table 5. 
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TABLE 5 BLACK ACTION SUGGESTED FOR NAMIBIA - OVERALL RESULTS AND 
SUBSTANTIAL VARIATIONS BETWEEN GROUPS IN REGARD TO ARMED INSURRECTION 
(Percentages across: sum to more 
answer could be given) 
than 100% since more than one 
Inactivity 
Passi vi ty 
Peaceful 
Protest/ 
Negotiation 
Organi sation 
Labour, 
Commercial 
Action 
Armed 
Confronta-
tion 
Overall Tvl/P.E. 
(Durban) 
% 36 
66 
67 
65 
25 
20 
56 
52 
UPWARD VARIATION 
16 to 24 Yrs % 66 
Higher Socio 
Econ Status % 68 
High School % 31 65 
Pretoria % 43 62 
Soweto % 32 66 
These results suggest that thoughts of armed 
confrontation are almost as prominent in the minds of the respondents 
as peaceful attempts at encouraging change. It is particularly 
the youth and better educated people, and people living in Soweto 
and Pretoria who are more militantly inclined. Curiously, 
results not presented in the table above show that those 
respondents working for U.S. companies in South Africa are 
significantly less militantly inclined than the sample in 
general. 
An item also aimed at testing general militancy 
and willingness to take political risks was as follows: 
"It is best for black people to be careful in politics and. not 
get into trouble and lose what they have." Those who disagreed 
with the item were taken as displaying a militant consciousness. 
The proportions who disagreed are listed below, 
in the form of the overall sample as well as subgroups displaying 
a substantially greater or lesser degree of political risk orientation: 
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INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO TAKE POLITICAL RISKS 
Overall Tvl./P.E. 
(Buthelezi Commission research 
1982. Equivalent Group, - Tvl) 
Durban 
61% 
(45) 
31 
Soweto 
Pretoria 
Trade Union Member 
Middle Education - Std. 5/6 
68 
71 
72 
67 
50 Yrs + 
East Rand 
Stds. 1-4 
51 
50 
50 
The comparison above with the sample from the 
Buthelezi Commission research in 1982 is particularly interesting 
because it suggests a growth of militancy between samples in 
time which were interviewed in exactly the same way and in a 
similar context. Generally the current results show high levels 
of militant consciousness particularly concentrated in Pretoria, 
Soweto and among black trade unionists. The more middle-class 
people who appeared most radical in the previous item drop away 
in the responses to the item above, perhaps suggesting that 
their militancy may not be a deep-seated as many think. 
was posed: "If the ANC were to come in secretly asking people 
to help itj which of the following would happen in your area? -
most would help it / not most but a large number / only a few." 
The proportions indicating that "most" would help it are 
presented below, on the assumption that it is a projection of 
private political feelings: 
Finally in this range of issues the question 
PERCEPTION THAT MOST PEOPLE WOULD HELP ANC 
Overall Tvl./P.E. 
Durban 
(Durban sample 1981,nl06) 
Pretoria 
Trade Union Members 
Std. 5/6 
(25)* 
42% 
19* 
61 
54 
47 
* Difference not significant. 
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The pattern of responses suggest that there is 
very substantial political militancy lurking in the black worker 
groups and the between-group variations are very similar to 
those reflected in response to the previous item. 
Generally the different patterns of variation 
which appear between the "Namibia" projection and the last two 
items of more immediate relevance to the local situation suggest 
that the better-educated people may like to sound more militant 
in regard to issues at a distance but that it is a group of 
middle education, involved in the trade union movement and 
particularly in Pretoria perhaps which has the most telling and 
consistent profile of attitudinal militancy. Even this, however, 
does not allow one to assume that they would behave in the way 
their attitudes incline them. 
The results suggest that the Durban workers are 
inclined to be more pragmatic and perhaps more restrained in their 
attitudes than the workers elsewhere. This pattern has been evident 
for some time in previous research and it may be due in large measure 
to the different style of leadership adopted by Inkatha in the region 
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Attitudes to Capitalism 
Employers in General 
Having established in the previous section that 
the cross section of black production workers dealt with in this 
report has a very radical orientation in a general political sense, 
linked with pervasive and serious discontentment over life 
chances, one would expect to find attitudes quite sharply critical 
of the typical employment situation of black workers. This is 
indeed the case. 
The following composite item was presented: 
"Here are a nwriber of things which black people have been heard 
to say about factories ... (etc). Tell me which you agree with and 
which you disagree with?" What followed was a balanced series 
of statements specified in the results presented in Table 6. 
This composite index of attitudes to typical 
workplaces reveals that the image of employers is dominantly 
negative, quantified in the general "index of criticism" in 
Table 6 as 71 percent overall, based on seven positive and six 
negative descriptions of typical employers of blacks. It is 
noteworthy that the most critical are trade union members and workers 
who conceive of using labour power for political protest. The 
more highly skilled workers are less critical as one would expect. 
Those who work in U.S. companies are least critical (but not very 
substantially less critical), in part but not only because they tend 
to be better-educated (51% of the 55 people employed in U.S. 
companies had high school education versus 36% in S.A. companies). 
The results, however, cannot be taken to be a reflection of U.S. 
companies because the question specified employers in general. Their 
answers were probably in part affected by their present employment, 
however. 
* Durban results are not included in this section. 
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TABLE 6 IMAGE PROFILE OF TYPICAL EMPLOYERS AS ENDORSED BY 
BLACK PRODUCTION WORKERS 
Percentage Agreement 
Overall T.U. 
U.S. 
Co. 
Labour 
Radicals* 
Hi gher 
Skills** 
1o 
They often try to help blacks by 
appealing to government 27 
% 
22 
% 
36 
% 
23 
% 
29 
They help blacks by providing work 57 60 66 55 61 
They pay as much to blacks as they 
can without losing profits 53 60 73 46 57 
They only dismiss blacks for serious 
faults after a fair investigation 33 24 27 31 37 
They try to help blacks with housing, 
education and loans 29 32 55 24 34 
They try to appoint helpful and 
sympathetic supervisors over blacks 26 21 36 23 27 
They train blacks in the factories 
for better jobs and promotion 43 48 58 41 44 
They allow their supervisors to 
treat blacks badly 59 63 51 58 53 
They get as much work from blacks for 
as little pay as possible 93 98 96 94 93 
They do not allow blacks to make 
progress or show ability in work 73 76 67 75 72 
They favour Indians or coloureds over 
black people 96 98 96 97 95 
They work with and support the 
government 91 95 100 90 95 
They dismiss black workers without 
giving them a chance to state their 
case 77 81 71 78 73 
Index of Criticism: Average of % 
agreement on negative items and 71 
% agreement - 100 on positive items 
73 64 73 69 
* Labour radicals - people willing to use labour power for political ends 
** Higher skilled = High school education. 
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More generally, the results show that private 
employers are very definitely seen to be part of a white 
establishment which includes the government. What is valued 
most is job opportunity, pay and training but employers are seen 
very negatively on other issues. 
Attitudes Around the Issue Labour Unrest 
In the light of the highly negative attitudes 
to employers revealed in the last section it is necessary to 
explore the structuring of workers thinking around the issue of 
labour unrest. One of the items read: "Which of the following 
things will cause black workers to strike or create disturbances 
in future years?" A list of structured alternatives was 
presented to respondents. Before this item in the interview, 
an open ended question requiring spontaneous answers was also 
asked: "In 1973 there were big strikes where many thousands of 
black workers went on strike together. What could cause this 
to happen again?" The results of both types of probe are 
given in table 7. 
The finding reflected in the two columns in 
Table 7 are not directly comparable with each other since they were 
obtained by different techniques and one relates to a mass strike 
while the other refers to a normal strike. However, an interpretation 
of the patterns allows one to assess the relative salience of 
different worker concerns around the topic of labour unrest. 
As one would expect, wages, as the primary 
reason for working, have the highest salience in both contexts. 
The quality of supervision and communication follows wages in 
importance, with unfair dismissals close behind as a specific 
issue. Race discrimination in industry is another important issue. 
Obviously, other work-related grievances, including pay deductions, 
are also highly salient. 
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TABLE 7 FACTORS CONSIDERED TO BE LIKELY TO LEAD TO STRIKES 
OR MASS STRIKES 
Factors identified 
Spontaneous 
answers re 
Mass strike 
Normal strike: 
Endorsement of 
structured 
alternatives 
Wage Grievances 
% 
91 
% 
95 
Unfair dismissals 18 94 
Supervi si on 27 94 
Race discrimination 11 91 
Pass Laws/Influx Control 10 75 
Pension deductions 1 50 
Tax 4 61 
Other grievances/deductions 30 71 
Political strike' 10 61 
Rents/housing shortage 8 66 
Worker - management communication 37 Not included 
Transport 7 II n 
Prices, Inflation, C.O.L. 10 II II 
To support Union call for strikes 3 
II M 
To support other workers on strike 2 
n n 
Other 
n ii 
The findings reflected in the two columns in Table 7 are not 
directly comparable with each other since they were obtained by different 
techniques and one relates to a mass strike while the other to a normal 
strike. However, an interpretation of the patterns allows one to assess 
the relative salience of different worker concerns around the topic of 
labour unrest. 
As one would expect, wages, as the primary reason for working, 
have the highest salience in both contexts. The quality of supervision 
and communication follows wages in importance, with unfair dismissals 
close behind as a specific issue. Race discrimination in industry is 
another important issue. Obviously, other work-related grievances, 
including pay deductions, are also highly salient. 
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It is the author's contention that despite a great 
deal of progress by management in understanding labour relations 
and the black-white interface, the salience of supervision, 
communication and race discrimination in industry are still 
hopelessly under-rated as factors inclining black workers towards 
stri ke-proneness. 
The results in the table are also interesting in 
that they reflect a somewhat lower salience of political issues, 
trade union solidarity and community issues in the context of 
strikes and worker action. Trade union and worker solidarity 
issues are particularly low in the consciousness of black workers 
in South Africa at the-present time (although they are perhaps 
unlikely to remain so). 
With regard to the issue of supervision, one of 
the tendencies currently is for employers to replace white 
supervisors with the next groups in the traditional South African 
racial hierarchy - coloureds or Indians. The respondents were 
given the following statement "Black workers are happy to work 
under coloured and Indian supervisors - do you agree or disagree?" 
No fewer than 92 percent disagreed with the statement, and this 
pattern was consistent across all categories of workers. This 
bears out the fact that generally not sufficient thought and 
planning is being given to the issue of Africanisation of 
supervisory positions. 
Trade Unions, Labour and Politics 
We have noted in the previous section that the 
black workers in the sample tend to separate political issues 
from the issue of strikes and labour disturbances. The topic of 
politics in labour and trade union activity was also approached 
more directly. One item was in the form of a 
conversation between two people. "One man Joseph says : Black 
people have many political problems but they must not let these 
problems disturb their work in the factories. Another man Paul 
says : jfe will never' solve oui1 political problems until we start 
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using our power as workers to demonstrate against the problems. 
Which man would you agree with?" 
No less than 72 percent of the workers 
supported the position that political problems could only be 
solved by worker action. This proposition rises to 79 percent 
among trade union members and 81 percent among those with middle levels 
of education (Std. 5/6) who were identified earlier as the most 
seriously radical workers. The proportion drops to 64 per cent 
among those employed in U.S Companies. 
This item reveals a strong concept of the 
potential of worker power in the political field, but it does 
not tell us whether or not the respondents would actually wish 
to see labour "disrupted" as a political weapon. We therefore 
have to consider other items as well. 
One probe concerned the role of trade 
Unions: "What can trade unions do for black people in South 
Africa?" Table 8 gives the patterns of spontaneous responses. 
TABLE 8 PERCEIVED ROLES OF TRADE UNIONS FOR BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Role of Unions % 
Improve wages 54 
Protect against dismissals/disciplinary action 26 
Improve management worker communication 21 
Foster black job advancement 18 
Improve other working conditions (diverse) 18 
Improve race relations and work 13 
Fight unemployment 13 
Improve housing/transport/community facilities 9 
Improve supervision 6 
Fight influx control 3 
Work for political rights 3 
Other mention 1 
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We note from these replies that political 
issues and community concerns outside the workplace are given 
relatively low ranks in the assessments of what trade unions 
can do. Members of trade unions give the same patterns of replies. 
It is interesting that even those people who in response to the 
previous probe endorsed the view that worker action could bring 
political changes did not envisage a political role for trade unions. 
It seems quite clear that unions are perceived and appreciated 
within an industrial and not a political context, even by workers 
who are political radicals. 
A more general view of the salience of trade 
unions is obtained from an item : "Which will be most valuable 
for an African like you?" - a series of "resources" was 
read out and respondents were asked to select one as most 
important, as appears in table 9. 
TABLE 9 RESOURCES OF GREATEST VALUE TO BLACKS 
Skills training for job advancement 
% 
43 
The Franchise 19 
A better education 16 
Strong black leadership 10 
Strong trade union 9 
Strong political organisation 3 
The results show how low in the list of 
general resources of value trade unions are. Even trade union 
members give trade unions a low ranking (12%) as to those 
workers who believe that labour action can bring political gains(8%). 
Hence it seems quite clear that trade unions are 
conceived as having an industrial and not a political role. This 
still leaves us with the question of whether or not black workers 
would be prepared to use labour power in a political context if 
they were mobilised by some other agency. Two items are relevant 
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here. Both items give the context of a "respected leader of 
black people wishing to show the strength of black people to 
the government ..." and asking black workers to 
a) "...stay away from work for two weeks" and 
b) "... not to buy from certain shops or 
certain goods..." 
The responses appear in Table 10. 
TABLE 10 WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION STRIKES 
OR TRADE BOYCOTTS 
% 
Political Strikes: Willingness to support 2 weeks strike 36 
Willingness to support shorter strike 19 
Unwi11i ng 45 
Trade Boycotts: Support for trade boycott 32 
Support for a few days 22 
Unwi11ing 41 
These items give a more suggestive view of the 
likelihood of politically inspired worker action. In both the 
political strike and the trade boycott, attitudes of full 
commitment seem to be present among just over one-third of the 
workers sampled. 
The proportions fully oriented to a political 
strike are slightly higher among the trade union members and 
worker-radicals referred to earlier but the proportions are still 
short of 50 percent. Otherwise there is remarkable evenness 
in the results across groups, with only the more affluent workers 
and workers in the Vaal Triangle showing a greater willingness to 
support the actions proposed. The same applies to the issue of a 
trade boycott. 
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In general then, one may sum up by saying that despite 
high levels of political discontent and a very poor image of the 
typical industrial employer group, the workers interviewed separate 
their labour and political agendas to a remarkable degree. Trade 
unions are not seen as political instruments, and while there is a 
cognitive awareness of .the political potential in labour action, no 
more than just over one-third of workers seem to have attitudes which 
would imply a full commitment to the use of labour action in a political 
context. 
Worker Ideology 
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The previous sections have shown that despite massive frustrations 
and discontent, the rank-and-file black factory worker is not orientated 
towards the destruction of capitalism using his labour power. The economic 
ideologies of the respondents are explained in more detail in the following 
section. 
Capitalism or Socialism 
The findings of Nasser (1984) as well as results already discussed 
in this report show clearly that one cannot expect the average black factory 
worker to evaluate the capitalist system in South Africa without being in-
fluenced by the broader racial issues in the country. Capitalists in 
South Africa, particularly the larger ones, are virtually all white and 
factory workers are dominantly black. Therefore one would never know to 
what extent the evaluation concerned capitalism as such or to what extent 
it reflects a rejection of the racial system which capitalism, avoidably or 
unavoidably, has accommodated. 
This distorting factor cannot be completely eliminated, but in an 
attempt to obtain replies in which the effects of the South African racial 
structure are at least minimised, the issue of capitalism versus socialism 
was explored in a non-South African context: "Think of a country ruled by 
blacks like Zambia or Kenya. What is best in such a country?" Alternatives 
were then read out carefully to respondents, and the results appear in Table 
11 below. 
TABLE II 
PREFERRED FORM OF ECONOMIC ORGANISATION IN A BLACK RULED COUNTRY 
Overall -
Tvl and 
P.E. 
US Co. 
emp'l oyees 
TU 
members 
High 
School 
education 
Factories and shops owned by 
black government 
% 
18 
% 
16 
% 
13 
% 
15 
Factories and shops owned by 
black businessmen 23 7 17 19 
Factories and shops owned by 
anyone who can be successful 
in business, not only black 
people 60 78 71 66 
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In addition to the data reported in Table 11, the following listing 
gives a comparative overview of the proportions in different subgroups of 
the sample supporting the free enterprise system. 
Proportions in subsamples endorsing the 
view that factories and shops should be 
owned privately by any successful individua1 
% 
Overall 60 
25 - 34 yrs of age 64 
West Rand 73 
Port Elizabeth 70 
Employed in US Co. 78 
Employed in other overseas 
Co. 67 
Previously employed in US Co 81 
High School Education 66 
TU member 71 
16 to 24 yrs 54 
East Rand 54 
Vaal Triangle 24 
Pretoria 41 
S.A. Company 55 
Unskilled 44 
These results show some remarkable variations, namely that trade 
union members are more accepting of the free enterprise system than average, 
that the more politicised and more "radical" workers with high school education 
are also committed to free enterprise and that those workers with experience 
of working in multi-national corporations, particularly US companies, are very 
substantially more likely to be in favour of the private capitalist system. 
The groups which are least likely to support capitalism are those 
who work in areas or companies in which racial discrimination is most severe, 
such as in Pretoria or the Vaal Triangle area, and among those who are 
least skilled, and who therefore see fewest benefits from the system. The 
younger employees (16 to 24) are also marginally less favourably inclined 
to free enterprise. An inspection of intercorrelations not presented shows 
that this is not due to any accompanying factors like low skill levels, etc. 
It seems that there is a tendency for the school-leaver or the newer employee 
to be less favourably disposed to the system. 
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More generally, however, the results seem to suggest quite 
clearly that the free enterprise system is dominantly the preferred 
alternative. This is despite the very persuasive option of businesses 
owned by a black government, and the possibly equally attractive alter-
native of businesses being limited to black ownership. The results 
appear to be compelling, and any notion that they may be due to fear 
or caution is dispelled by-earlier findings which showed that workers feel 
completely free to disclose their support for banned organisations like 
the ANC. 
Industry and Race 
The workers may be accommodating of capitalism but they are by . 
no means inclined to accept the racial capitalism which is still character-
istic of much of South African industry. The data on the image of South 
African employers presented earlier in this report bear witness to this. 
Even clearer evidence comes from two items included in the questionnaire 
on racial equality-inequality in industry, the results of which appear in 
Table 12. 
TABLE 12 
ATTITUDES TO RACIAL EQUALITY IN INDUSTRY VERSUS ABSOLUTE GAINS 
Overall -
TVL and P.E. 
0/ 
"What would people like you prefer?" 
/o 
'All races growing more prosperous quite slowly but 
with whites and blacks becoming more equal" 92 
"All races growing more prosperous quickly but with 
whites staying as far ahead of blacks as at present" 8 
"What would you prefer?" 
"Blacks and whites getting the same salaries for the 
same jobs but everyone getting very small increases" 90 
"Black and white salaries staying unequal for some 
years but everyone being given quite large regular 
increases" 9 
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These results are so overwhelmingly in favour of equality, 
despite the "trade off" of lower absolute gains built into the items, 
that there can be no doubt that a very definite consciousness about 
racial equality exists among black workers. (See also Buthelezi 
Commission, 1982, in which similar questions were asked.) There was 
such unanimity regarding these issues in the sample that no significant 
differences between subgroups in the sample exist. 
This does not necessarily mean that the expectations are that 
the respondents expect the hierarchy as it exists at the moment to be 
overturned immediately. The desire, rather, is for equality of opportunity 
and treatment. Some idea of the balance in the views of the respondents 
can be obtained from the results to an item which read as follows: "Whites 
are strict but they are honest and fair blacks would not be happier 
under their own people." The percentage agreement with the statement 
was as follows: 
Acceptance of whites in authority 
% 
Overall 45 
50 years and 
older 54 
Vaal Triangle 35 
Pretoria 29 
Unskilled 38 
Trade union 
members 41 
The pattern of results shows that it is among the workers in 
the areas of greatest traditionalism in race relations that whites in 
authority are least accepted Pretoria and the Vaal Triangle. Un-
skilled workers, who have the greatest difficulty in communicating with 
whites are also less inclined to accept whites in authority. In 1981 
the percentage agreement to an identical question among black workers 
in the research for the Buthelezi Commission (Witwatersrand sample, 
N 228) was 35 percent, a full 10 percent below the current finding. 
Therefore it would seem that no trend towards an increasing rejection 
of white authority exists. 
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Overseas Investment in and Trade with South Africa 
This topic is the focal point of the study. Up to now we 
have seen results pointing to a very poor image of industrial management 
held by black workers in South Africa but also to an acceptance of 
capitalism and to a general rejection of the use of organised labour in 
the political struggle, despite high levels of politicisation and serious 
political grievances. There is, thus, a mixture of frustration and 
pragmatism in the consciousness of black workers which does not contain 
any clear indications of what their attitudes to disinvestment and trade 
boycotts might be. 
Disinvestment and trade boycotts of South Africa are complex 
issues which are not likely to form part of popular debate among black 
workers. Therefore these issues had to be approached with great care 
in the interviews. Fairly detailed explanations of the issues in clear 
and simple language were given before questions were posed. The same 
themes were also addressed in several different questions in order to 
make the results as valid as possible. The results are given in the 
sequence of Tables which follow (Tables 13 to 1 7 ) . Each Table includes 
the exact phrasing of the explanation and the questions asked. In each 
question alternative answers were rotated in presentation in order to 
eliminate recall bias; 
TABLE 13 PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTERESTS PROMOTED BY FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Item "Which one of the following is true. When American companies 
build factories in South Africa, who do they help most?" 
Overal1 
Sample 
Employed in 
US Company 
Help the African people to progress 
% 
38 
% 
26 
Help the whites 16 31 
Help the South African Government 46 44 
n 451 n = 55 
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These results give an inconclusive result. While in the sample 
as a whole over one-third see blacks as the main beneficiaries of US invest-
ment, this, oddly enough, drops to just over 25 percent among those employed 
in US companies. It is probable, however, that even though most respondents 
saw whites or the government as the main beneficiaries, they did not 
necessarily see blacks as not gaining at all from external investment. 
This is clarified in Table 14 below. 
TABLE 14 SUPPORT FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT VERSUS DISINVESTMENT 
AND TRADE BOYCOTTS 
Item "One man, Samuel says: "Overseas people and banks and 
companies must stop buying South African goods and stop 
sending money to build factories in South Africa so as to 
frighten the South African government into getting rid of 
Apartheid." 
"Another man Joseph says: "People and banks and companies 
overseas should continue to buy South African goods and send 
money to build factories because it makes jobs for all people 
in South Africa. " 
Which man would you agree with, Samuel or Joseph? 
Overall Employed in 
Sample US Company 
% % 
Support for Samuel (Disinvestment/ 
Boycott) 25 29 
Support for Joseph (Constructive 
Engagement) 75 71 
Although very slightly m^re employees in US companies support the 
disengagement position than among black workers in general, very clear 
majorities of employees in both the overall sample and the subsample support 
engagement. Variations in the degree of support for disinvestment are 
listed below. 
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Support for Disinvestment/Trade sanctions 
% 
Overall 25 
1 6 - 2 4 yrs 33 
Worker radicals 
(support for use of labour 
in political action) 29 
35 yrs and older 20 
Under Std. 4 education 20 
There is thus very little variation in the results. Trade 
union members, for example, are no more likely to support disinvestment 
than other workers. The higher support for disinvestment among employees 
in US companies is in large measure due to the fact that these companies 
have a higher proportion of 16 - 24 year old people in service (33% US Co's, 
24% overall) and also have fewer people with lower educational qualifications. 
It should be noted that the item reported on in Table 14 has a 
built-in incentive to support the disinvestment position, namely the 
phrase "....frighten the South African government into getting rid of 
Apartheid " Given this deliberate suggestion in the question, it is 
remarkable that only one-quarter of the respondents support disinvestment. 
At another point in. the interview the same theme was explored, 
as indicated in Table 15. 
The results overall are remarkably similar to those in Table 14. 
It is the workers from Pretoria, the nerve centre of apartheid, who are 
most inclined to support disinvestment. The reasons for such support 
make it clear that even among the disinvestment group, one important position 
taken is aimed at improving wages and conditions rather than being aimed 
at a complete ending to foreign investment. The reasons in favour of 
disinvestment also emphasise political factors rather than intentions to harm 
management, while the reasons against it feature fears of loss of 
employment and the consequent harm to blacks as the most prominent factors. 
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TABLE 15 
SUPPORT FOR OR OPPOSITION TO EXTERNAL INVESTMENT 
"There are groups of people in America and England who try to encourage 
banks and organisations not to invest money in South Africa - not to 
put their money in factories which are in South Africa. Do you 
think this is a good or a bad thing?" 
Overal1 
Sample 
% 
Employees in 
US Companies 
% 
Good thing (Disinvestment) 26 24 
Bad thing (Engagement) 74 76 
"Why do you feel this way?" 
Good (Spontaneous) (Base 100%* ) (Base 100%*) 
Warn South African Government/ 
Frighten South African Government 30 62 
Weaken Government/whites 18 23 
Weaken managers/employers/capitalists 9 15 
Encourage better wages/conditions 39 54 
Encourage political rights for blacks 28 46 
Other 4 -
"Why do you feel this way?" 
Bad (Spontaneous) (Base 100%*) (Base 100%*) 
Fewer jobs 54 50 
South Africa becomes poorer 19 26 
Harms blacks 41 48 
Makes no difference/no effect 5 5 
Harms South Africa/Government 12 19 
Other 2 -
* Answers exceed 100% because more than one answer was given 
Variations in support for disinvestment as measured in the results 
in Table 15 show the following pattern. 
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Support for Disinvestment 
% 
Overall 26 
Pretoria 35 
Employees at non-
US multinationals 19 
50+ years 16 
East Rand 15 
A very similar question was asked but one relating to trade 
sanctions rather than disinvestment (see Q.20 in the interview schedule). 
The results obtained are so similar to those given in Table 15 that it 
is unnecessary to repeat the full table. Some 26 percent supported 
trade sanctions against South Africa (24 percent among employees in US 
companies) while 74 percent felt that trade sanctions were bad. Once 
again the effects of sanctions on employment opportunity and therefore 
on black welfare were prominent among the reasons given. 
Finally, among the range of questions on disinvestment, a third 
type of question was posed, the details of which plus the results appear 
in Table 16. 
TABLE 16 SUPPORT FOR DISINVESTMENT, CONTINUED INVESTMENT OR 
CODES OF CONDUCT FOR COMPANIES 
"Which of the following would you prefer to see 
best?" 
happen 3 Co
 
(The alternatives were read twice, reversing order on second reading.) 
Overal1 
sample 
Employees in 
US Companies 
0/ 
"American companies should build as many 
factories in South Africa as they can, making 
as many jobs for blacks as they can." 
to 
59 
/O 
60 
"American companies should only run factories in 
South Africa if they can pay blacks high wages, 
give good pensions and help with housing, even if 
they make fewer jobs." 32 33 
"American companies should not run factories in 
South Africa because they make the government 
of South Africa stronger." 
i 9 7 
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Among trade union members the support for complete withdrawal 
rises very slightly to 13 percent, among people in Soweto it is 14 percent 
and in Port Elizabeth it is 12 percent. Other variations between sub-
samples are even less significant. Thus here again there is consensus 
in the sample. 
These results are noteworthy. Even when the option of codes 
of conduct including higher wages and other benefits is built into the 
probe, as is the case in Table 16, the majority of respondents still hold 
firmly to an opposition to anything which might remove US investment from 
South Africa. Furthermore, when the option of codes of conduct is presented 
to respondents, the proportion in favour of disinvestment drops from the 
24 - 25 percent recorded in Tables 14 and 15 to a mere 9 to 12 percent. • 
Hence one must conclude that the promotion of total disinvestment by US 
companies operating in South Africa has virtually no support among black 
workers in the very representative areas surveyed. 
The reasons given in Table 15 indicate some of the major 
factors inclining workers to support continued investment. There are 
other factors as well, one of which is the image of US companies in South 
Africa. Results on this are given in Table 17. 
The results in Table 17 are remarkably favourable for US 
companies as far as employment image is concerned. The slightly but 
consistently less flattering image held by the actual employees of US 
companies shows that the image outstrips the performance to some extent. 
Even among the US company employees, however, the employment image is 
consistently much more favourable than unfavourable. 
Given the outstanding reputation that US companies appear to 
enjoy among black production workers it is not surprising that so little 
Support for disinvestment exists. The fact that the employees in the US 
companies themselves share almost as favourable an image would strongly 
suggest that the codes of employment practice (the Sullivan Code) has 
had a very salutory effect on personnel policies in these companies. 
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TABLE 17 
IMAGE OF THE EMPLOYMENT PERFORMANCE OF US COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
"There are a number of American companies in South Africa. How do you 
think these companies compare with South African companies? Even if you 
do not know for sure, please tell us what you have heard or what you 
think is true." 
Wages % 
"Do American companies pay blacks more, 
the same or less as South African 0, 
companies?" 
More Same Less* 
All 74 17 6 
US 
Co. 
empl. 
67 27 6 
Help with housing and education % 
"Do American companies help blacks 
with housing and education more, the „, 
same or less than South African 
companies?" 
All 71 18 6 
US 
Co 58 29 13 
Training of blacks % 
"Do American companies train blacks 
for better jobs more, the same or 
less than South African companies?" % 
All 75 16 7 
US 
Co 67 22 11 
Dealing with black unions % 
"Are American companies willing to 
negotiate and deal with black trade 
unions more, the same or less than 
South African companies?" % 
All 60 24 7 
US 
Co 46 31 16 
Supervision ' % 
"Do American companies have better, 
the same, or worse supervision, that 
is, supervisors and foremen, than 
South African companies?" % 
Better Same Worse 
All 65 24 4 
US 
Co 58 33 7 
Disciplinary practices % 
"Are American companies more fair, 
the same, or less fair in discipline 
than South African companies?" % 
All 70 20 5 
US 
Co 51 35 11 
* Balance making up 100% consisted of 'Don't Know'. 
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Results from the Durban sample (n 100) not presented 
thusfar tend to confirm the broad pattern of reactions to dis-
investment which has been noted. The interviewing in Durban was 
conducted by a separate team of interviewers working under different 
supervision, yet the results obtained are virtually identical. 
The following are comparsions of percentage support for the dis-
investment positions between the Transvaal/Port Elizabeth and the 
Durban samples on the items in tables 14, 15 and 16 respectively: 
25% vs 28%, 26% vs 28% and 9% vs 7%. The Durban respondents, 
however, gave less favourable evaluations of US company employ-
ment performance. The average endorsement of the view that US 
companies are better than South African companies on all the 
issues listed in Table 17 for the Durban sample was 60 percent 
versus 69 percent for the Transvaal/Port Elizabeth sample. The 
60 percent average for the Durban sample nevertheless shows that 
even in an area in which very few US companies operate they are 
viewed in a more favourable light than South African companies. 
Generally speaking, then, the results accumulate to 
show a very substantial majority opposition to disinvestment policy. 
It might be argued that too great an incentive was given to support 
the disinvestment position by mentioning the effect on job creation 
in the wording of the items. This incentive, however, was 
matched by the opposite incentive which was worded as "frightening 
the South African Government into getting rid of Apartheid'.'. 
Generally speaking black people have great faith — often 
unrealistic faith — in the capacity of the Western powers to 
influence the South African government. There is no reason why the 
wording of the disinvestment position should have been any less 
attractive than the wording of the pro-investment alternatives. 
It might also be argued that these responses cannot 
be generalised for the black population as a whole. Some observers 
would expect a better educated and more sophisticated population 
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like that of Soweto, for example, to support a pro-disinvestment 
position. 
Results from the sample in this study itself, however, 
would contradict this view. The following is a comparison between 
the percentage support for disinvestment in the Transvaal/Port 
Elizabeth sample as a whole anc' in the Soweto and the high-school 
subsamples, across the items presented in tables 14, 15 and 16: 
Overall Soweto High School 
(n451) (n146) Education 
(n175) 
% % % 
Table 14 25 26 31 
15 26 26 26 
16 9 14 11 
From this comparison it would appear to be highly unlikely that 
a Soweto sample would give majority endorsement to a disinvestment 
position. A white collar and student sample in Soweto might 
produce a substantially higher proportion favouring disinvestment 
but then this would have to be interpreted as a black middle class 
viewpoint. Given the very small size of the black middle cldss 
in South Africa it could never be taken as representative of 
rank-and-file blacks in any part of the country. 
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Concluding Discussion 
The results of this study form an interesting pattern. 
There seens little doubt that black industrial workers are res-
ponding to the present socio-political climate. Generally the 
effects of the economic recession are also clearly evident in 
their attitudes. 
There is evidence of sharp discontentment among clear 
majorities of black workers. There is also a clear majority 
awareness of political policy as it affects blacks and a dominant 
rejection of the present policy dispensation. Added to this there 
is a militant sentiment evident in well over half of the black 
workers surveyed. 
This militant sentiment among the better educated workers 
could be largely rhetorical, reflecting the fact that they have 
absorbed the mood of the black media and the black intelligentsia 
in the townships. There is, however, also strong evidence that 
categories of workers who were probably formerly less politicised 
are reacting with anger to conditions and constraints. 
This is evident in the attitudes of even less well-
educated workers in places like Pretoria and the Vaal Triangle, 
where race relations tend to be worse than in, say, Johannesburg.' 
In other words, the militancy of sentiment expressed in these 
results is not by any means only due to any fashionable radical 
political culture in places like Soweto. These results give 
evidence of very serious grass-roots anger in places not usually 
expected to be at the forefront of black political thinking. 
Despite these clear trends, however, the major pattern 
is for black workers to separate political issues from the in-
dustrial sphere. Notwithstanding a very poor image of employers 
and management in general, the workers do not allow their political 
feelings to colour workplace strategies. Hence a minority of 
4 2 . 
Concluding Discussion 
The results of this study form an interesting pattern. 
There seems little doubt that black industrial workers are res-
ponding to the present socio-political climate. Generally the 
effects of the economic recession are also clearly evident in 
their attitudes. 
There is evidence of sharp discontentment among clear 
majorities of black workers. There is also a clear majority 
awareness of political policy as it affects blacks and a dominant 
rejection of the present policy dispensation. Added to this there 
is a militant sentiment evident in well over half of the black 
workers surveyed. 
This militant sentiment among the better educated workers 
could be largely rhetorical, reflecting the fact that they have 
absorbed the mood of the black media and the black intelligentsia 
in the townships. There is, however, also strong evidence that 
categories of workers who were probably formerly less politicised 
are reacting with anger to conditions and constraints. 
This is evident in the attitudes of even less well-
educated workers in places like Pretoria and the Vaal Triangle, 
where race relations tend to be worse than in, say, Johannesburg.' 
In other words, the militancy of sentiment expressed in these 
results is not by any means only due to any fashionable radical 
political culture in places like Soweto. These results give 
evidence of very serious grass-roots anger in places not usually 
expected to be at the forefront of black political thinking. 
Despite these clear trends, however, the major pattern 
is for black workers to separate political issues from the in-
dustrial sphere. Notwithstanding a very poor image of employers 
and management in general, the workers do not allow their political 
feelings to colour workplace strategies. Hence a minority of 
4 3 . 
of workers emerge as being sufficiently militant to infuse 
labour issues with wider political objectives. It should be 
borne in mind, however, that the minority is substantial; 
roughly one-third of workers seem to have the sentiments which 
would incline them to use labour power to gain political objectives. 
Most black workers, therefore, have a split conscious-
ness at the present time, with a minority, albeit substantial, 
having a consistent militancy which^covers both labour, community 
and political issues. The majority appear to value the benefits 
of wage employment sufficiently not to wish to see their work 
opportunities destabilised by political action. 
This is valid for the present, but the minority whose 
political and labour attitudes are consistently militant could 
grow over time if political discontents increase or become more 
intense. 
This pattern of consciousness is compatible with the 
finding that black workers do not reject capitalism as a system, 
even though they are very emphatic in wishing to see it improved 
so as to produce equality of opportunity. The black workers may 
be very angry but they have not yet become ideologically estranged 
from the present industrial system. 
The results of the present study in many ways support 
those of Nasser (1984) in showing that a great deal of resentment 
and mistrust of management exists. Nevertheless they still appear 
to perceive prospects of the employment system of industrial 
South Africa being improved to eliminate the discrimination they 
appear to experience. It is noteworthy, however, that in some 
areas, like the Vaal Triangle and Pretoria, the results show 
(tentatively because of small subsample size) that resentments 
are so great that majorities reject the capitalist system in these 
areas. This is. a clear indication of the danger inherent in not 
eliminating race discrimination in industry. 
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Given the broad pattern of findings, however, it is perhaps 
not surprising that black production workers in South Africa are not 
likely at this stage to support the programmes abroad to promote with-
drawal of Western or more specifically United States capital from the 
South African economy. The conclusions are based on a variety of 
probes in the survey, some of which included a rationale for disinvest-
ment which would be politically persuasive for black people. The 
pattern of replies, however, remained consistent, showing a large and 
firm majority in favour of continued and increased US investment 
in South Africa. 
These findings are very consistent with other results, which 
show that those blacks employed in US companies are likely to have a 
slightly more favourable view of employers than other workers. There 
can be little doubt from this trend, as well as from the very favourable 
employment image which US companies enjoy, that for black workers the 
presence of US capital in South Africa is highly valued. 
Quite obviously the motivations of the black production workers 
are very pragmatic. They perceive the issue of external investment 
and trade policy with regard to South Africa in bread and butter terms. 
They take an unabashedly short-run and material view of the issue. 
Nevertheless, they are the people on whose behalf the disinvestment campaign 
is waged abroad, and for that reason their preferences should be heeded 
by protagonists in the campaign. 
There is perhaps another reason why the preference of these black 
production workers should oount in the debate. Their replies on 
political issues show clearly that they are no dull, apathetic and crushed 
proletariat who must be saved from a morass of false consciousness by 
liberated minds abroad. These production workers have very firm political 
views and very substantial proportions are inclined to express support for 
the very agencies who are pursuing the objectives of disengagement abroad. 
If ever these agencies achieve formal influence in South African policy and 
affairs black production workers of the kind sampled for this study will be 
among the first supporters of that leadership. 
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In the meantime, however, these production workers have to 
weigh their political commitments rgainst their responsibilities. While 
very aggrieved and fairly radical in regard to their political circumstances 
they realise that the system of industrial production, for all its 
weaknesses which they are the first to recognise, spells survival for the 
black proletariat. 
This awareness may be heightened at a time of recession and high 
unemployment like the present, but comparative results over time which have 
been quoted show that the attitudes of these workers are not ephemeral but 
have a consistent pattern. They wish to see the benefits of the industrial 
system protected, no matter what the other aspects of political change 
might be. They are prepared to express support for banned organisations 
and over a third of them are even prepared to say that they will participate 
in a mass political strike, but they want their employment and material 
opportunities protected. Disinvestment by US companies and trade sanctions 
are a threat to their material and work interests, and therefore they oppose 
them with firm consistency. 
In short, black workers make a balanced, strategic assessment of 
their position and of potential gains and losses. It involves a necessary 
(for them) distinction between political and survival strategy which extends 
to a very careful distinction between alternative roles for trade unions. 
They appear not to see it as functional for unions and labour organisation 
to become involved in a political campaign. The extent to which they 
achieve a notion of specific domains of activity is remarkable, and it 
contradicts many a thesis that black workers are non-modern men who cannot 
seperate specific principles from diffuse and general grievances. 
Some people may argue that it is precisely this tendency among 
South African blacks to give priority to short-term survival and security 
that has crippled the black liberation struggle. This is the kind of 
prescriptive stance that can only be taken by well-educated middle class 
activists, however, for whom survival and security is not an issue. Change 
in South Africa is not primarily to be sought for the benefit of the disaffected 
middle class activists, and therefore any "liberation" must occur with the 
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support and involvement of the black working classes unless it is to be 
yet something else which is imposed on black people. It is perhaps 
appropriate, then, for programmes of change in South Africa to work 
within the priorities and possibilities of the black working classes. 
In this sense the disinvestment strategy, whatever its validity as 
a means of providing opposition to vested white interests and structures, 
cannot claim to be a campaign on behalf of the black rank-and-file people of 
South Africa. 
Perhaps the major implication of this study is that most black 
workers in South Africa at this stage keep the spheres of politics and labour 
action separate. This should not comfort employers and the authorities 
unduly, however. A majority of these black workers appear to realise that 
their labour power could be a powerful political weapon should they wish 
to use it. Furthermore, a substantial minority has sufficiently militant 
sentiments to have bridged the separation between the political and occupational 
spheres. Unless policy reforms occur to alleviate the frustrations and 
grievances of black workers in their daily lives more and more of them will 
draw their political views into the sphere of labour. Given the increasing 
militancy which this study has demonstrated, reform in urban policy, 
community development and influx control laws has become a critical neccessity. 
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